A ROMANIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE EU DEVELOPING REFORMS
Sever Avram
EUROLINK - House of Europe, Bucharest
After the anticommunist revolutions in the captive part of Europe, which took place in 1989, the states which had taken the way of European unification in 1957 seemed to a large extent unprepared to assume on the way the great political and economic challenges they encountered. In spite of their opening to accession of the former satellite-states of Moscow, the new construction of E.U., initiated after 1992, turned to a deep crisis of identity and evolution different from the periods of organisational inertia and economical deadlock in the past. Neither the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty after the long Intergovernmental Conference which was supposed to produce a brand new strengthened profile for Europe did succeed to unblock the "institutional crisis" the fifteen encountered. However the signs of a political will for most of the major actors in E.U. – with the predictable exception of the Great Britain -- showed up: to endow the new political construction with a European Constitution, to eliminate the so-called "democratic deficit" accumulated in spite of the partial reforms already enterprised, to deepen a federalist profile for its members, to opt for a distinctive voice of E.U. as a unitary protagonist in matters requiring firm and clear decisions at an international level.
The legitimate question to be asked is one about the possibility to make compatible the two types of problems which constitute the concern – in parallel, but in a different manner -- of the offices in the two temporary divided parts of the old continent.
On the one hand there is the concern of many candidate states for the rather slow rhythm and the too severe conditions for accession to E.U. in the circumstances of an international climate mined with many factors of uncertainty and political-military risk as well as for the possibility of economic and political marginalisation in a delayed lobby they are forced to.
On the other hand there are the internal movements among the members E.U. in view of their own mechanism of major decision-taking in a much enlarged Union of the future, the worry for an unpredictable competition to appear and a migration with effects hardly prognosable for the citizens in the newly adhered states towards the more developed states in E.U., the incapacity to formulate an explicit option for internal organisation in the circumstances of the increasing pressures for globalisation not only economic but political too, as well as the new world hegemonies threatens while the U.S.A. could give up their role of so-called "international protector" or unquestionable shield of an extended Europe.
It is not for the first time in the history of the project prefigured by the Monnet-Schuman plan when the European construction crosses, after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, a period of disconcerting slowing in the rhythm of essential decisions and of uncertainty regarding the future trend of the European institutions. In the past the analysts called such periods stagnation, decisional paralysis or even "Euro- sclerosis". Now the vaguer term of institutional crisis is preferred. Whatever label we choose, the problem is not only the continuity and the stability of the actual European Union, but the whole development process of unifying and consolidating Europe.
After the formation of new democratic States, beyond the former Iron Curtain, the number of challenges faced by the European Community increased and chronicisised not only in the context of making compatible the policies and the internal development rhythms. From the fall of the communist system the twelve Member States have had to take crucial decisions regarding at least three major tendencies/aspects on the geo-political and geo-economical plan:
In other words, the multiplication of the challenges for the decisional process in Brussels was expected to find to a large extent unprepared the Western offices. Most of the Member States efforts had focused until 1990 on a manner of honourable cohabitation with the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes, on the one side, and on the avoidance or minimising the effects of certain crises of their Monetary System in course of unification, on the other side. The urgency to answer clearly to the requests of accession to the European Community had not permitted until soon the possibility of reformulating openly the principles and the objective of the dialogue initiated by the EU members and the new aspirants to integration. Briefly, this slack or discrepancy between the expectations of the two parts was temporarily dissolved by devising the so-called Association Agreements and by editing the White Book at the suggestion of the European Commission.
Unfortunately, these tools together with the formal notices, expressed by the same European Commission did not succeed to stimulate a rethinking of the whole process of negotiations and preparations in view of extending the European Union. Although implemented in the official practice, the dialogue forms between the EU representatives and the Candidate-States representatives haven't succeeded to reach the necessary degree of inter-communication, of real feed-back liable to produce a visible differentiation of the manner of decision-taking over the integration of the new states. EU as a whole, and the Commission particularly, has been often condemned by its critics on good grounds not so much for its being slow and lacking transparency but rather for its insufficient receptivity for a) the needs claimed by the Candidate-States for asking real support; b) according a purely consultative statute to the proposals of EU internal reform or to those regarding the mechanisms of extending come from the Candidate-States. In these circumstances some of the leaders of the pilot team formed in Visegrad, especially the Polish ex-President Lech Walesa came to talk about the interposal of a Silver Curtain at the borders between the West and the East. Such an offensive tactic was supplemented in the case of the countries more advanced in the process of accession negotiations by focusing over the internal structural reforms.
However, the regulations of the "select club"- type of EU have not been seriously affected by any of the criticisms formulated by the competitors for accession. The process by itself gives rather the impression of a race with obstacles than of a team loyalty in favour of reaching the same common end: a new European spirit of unity and solidarity. The main cause of this drawback is, of course, not only the impossibility of mutual conditioning between Members and Candidates to accession, but also the differences between the main priorities of the two groups of states. It is only normal that the benchmark should be set by the European Union, due to its democratic experience in the field of liberty of the Unique Market. Nevertheless, a confrontation/ adjustment between the two sides could not be but profitable to the progress of negotiations and to the mutual adjustment towards the intended objectives.
Not long ago, the Member States of EU were mainly preoccupied with the harmonisation at a comunitary level of their own major decisions, especially those concerning the freedom of travelling without a visa within the Union, the implementation of the unique currency and the consolidation of the Monetary Union, increasing the flexibility of labour markets and making the fighting unemployment programs compatible. The observations or criticism that came from the Candidate-States were interpreted, most often, as forms of temporary rebellion and could not get a right answer from those called to reflect upon fighting the institutional crisis, and also upon calming the nationalistic outbursts which periodically came from one or another of the Member-countries.
It seems like the undesired result of the latest parliamentary elections in Austria had the opposite effect of producing a refreshing of the Union leaders and of the new representatives of the European Commission. To be more precise, any source of political instability or of disregard of the democratic standards in one country or another started to be perceived as a potential threat to the global stability, or to the fluency of the extension process based on the political criteria established at Copenhagen. As for the rhythm and way of continuing the European integration process, too great a number of proposals and theories have been formulated, theories concerning the necessity of applying a variable geometry, of extension on the principle of concentric circles around a hard core or accepting several speeds within the developing process. As a matter of fact, from the very moment that Great Britain initially refused to sign the Social Charter, this principle had been somehow tacitly accepted. The lack of participation of some Member-States to the Unique Monetary System raises questions about the coherence and viability of the whole process, too. But, as it is the first time in history that the European unification is being achieved, step by step, through large democratic consultations, it is assumed as inherent the difficulty of imposing a unique policy on collectivises with mentalities, traditions and cultures apparently so different from each other. In this case, is it not seriously questioned the possibility of framing a European citizenship based on a specific statute to guarantee equal standards and rights, of a political coherence which avoids the appearance of internal untimings, but also as regards other world political and economic powers?
It would be useful for a digression, we hope, to label as not serious any doubt concerning the significant cultural differences among the countries, regions and communities on the continent. Nevertheless it is important considering to what extent deepening the European unification may coexist with preserving and defending the cultural identities taken separately without giving up the common objectives of an extended EU. This dilemma already gave way to many lexical abuses and demagogic reactions. Therefore, this is not the right place to broach this controversial topic. However we should notice that the antagony between the economical, financial or informational globalisation it is subject to and … Europe is not in a real relation of antagony with the cultural characteristics as it is often asserted in many academic and political milieu. The source of divergence is rather deeper, placed in that "crisis of the fundamentals" that the Czech philosopher Karel Kosic spoke of or in the precariousness of the legitimacy of major decisions through making responsible in the name of some universal values non-hypocritically assumed. Of course, Europe cannot isolate itself from these tendencies and controversies just by asserting the fact that it took all measures of self defence in time in order not to sacrifice all the values it has extolled and disseminated through the world for the sake of the obvious mirage of the "free market". From this point of view, it is pretty clear the main components of any cultural tradition or characteristic will have more chances of dissemination, differentiation and internal renewal when placed in a state of geographically and tribally unconstrained expression of itself. There is no doubt some of them will be almost fatally absorbed by other forms of expression, by other cultures... However, the European culture has never been a space of purely vestigial accumulation but rather one of clashes generating new possibilities, deeper and deeper critical and spiritual interrogations. On the other hand, there still remains an open question, for instance, whether the objective of achieving the Informational Society from the Agenda 2000 would not affect disproportionally the chances of existence for the public space to the advantage of an "individual", completely privatised one. Without mobilising a dynamic permanent public space, we cannot speak of any cultural characteristic, whether regional, national or European.
Up to this point we paused very briefly over the two types of positioning towards the future of the common Europe: 1) demanding or dual (zealous and demanding) from the part of the "petitioners" in the waiting room; 2) relativising and temporising from the part of the EU members which haven't succeeded by now to agree on the future architecture of the common edifice. Apparently it is about the difficulties generated by the social and economical conditions which divide the demanders from the possessors of the member card and the various polarisations of "national interests" within the Union States. In the West, there are very few who notice the inter-dependence factor that links the stability on a medium and long term to the moment when new democratic states are to be received. This kind of minimalization is part and parcel of the drawbacks inherent to the process and could not be seriously replaced unless the Presidency of EU would be finally authorised to adopt a common external political policy satisfying criteria of coherence. Changing the manner of decision-taking in this field assumes additional loss of national sovereignty without losing the characteristics and the interests of each component part of EU.
Considering the premises and the drawbacks briefly mentioned above, we could systematise the evolution of the EU organism according to three hypothetical scenarios liable to highlight the virtual developments describing the general trajectory of the European construction.
A. THE OPTIMISTIC (Utopian) SCENARIO
This perspective presents the possibility of a Europe rapidly unified, politically strengthened, animated by the principle of the universality of fundamental values/marks, enthralled by the spirit of intercultural education, but preserving especially those cultural aspects likely to bring mutual enrichment.
From the point of view of prompting Romania to its own economic and political internal reforms, this scenario seems to be the most recommendable -- desirable for the Union's partners as well as for the countries in process of accession -- in view of the accomplishment of a harmonious European construction. Next we will go through its most important characteristic elements.
1. Adopting a European Constitution
One of the most controversial matters in the post-Amsterdam debate is the adoption of a European Constitution. The main cause of the controversies regards the fact that for most politicians such a Constitution assumes abandoning inter-governmentalism -- which would actually be equivalent to even losing the last bit of sovereignty and the privileges subsumed for the national parliaments -- and proclaiming federalism as a guiding principle for the future reforms of EU. A European Constitution, a project in work especially in Paris and Berlin, would allow:
Adopting a Constitution for the Whole Europe would be only the first but also the most decisive step towards imposing the principles of unity in diversity, solidarity in subsidiarity. It would allow the opportunity to escape from the present ambiguity, would decrease the legal abuses at a national or local level and would permit to establish a significant political role for Europe.
2. Constructing a dynamic balance between the freedom, the prosperity of the Unique European Market and the European social and civic rights
The sharpening of the market competition in the world or the so-called pressure of economic and financial globalisation would deserve to stimulate an innovative strategy at the European level. This strategy would allow solving the spurious dilemma/dispute between mutilating the identities by the blind tyranny of the market logic and the freedom of cultivating one’s own thinking, most often already reduced to an ethnographic and vestigial dominant component. For any lucid mind, it is clear that the future European economy cannot avoid the effects of the globalisation process without appeal to a Unique Plan, that is without assuming the sacrifice of the liberty of initiative and action for the enterpriser but rather assuming the adoption of a coherent and well-organised economic strategy. Nevertheless, what Europe has to say will really matter for the next century at the global level only to the extent to which the European economic giant will succeed to change the well-rooted mentalities concerning the position and the ethos of work and imposing gradually viable economic and social alternatives to the reductionist concept of continuous economic growth at any price -- of the "sustainable development" kind. In other words, only deepening the economic integration together with a political reorganisation and a civic remobilization of all regions of the continent would help it resist the tight competition and the influence of other important power-centres in the world.
3. Simplifying and accelerating the decision-taking process at the level of the Council of Ministers and the other European institutions depending on the assessment of the internal reform
Together with the desirably rapid increase in the number of EU Members, extending the vote by qualified majority and even by assuming the simple majority -- when unblocking a potentially explosive situation is absolutely compulsory -- within the debates of the Council of Ministers and the European Council becomes a key-element of the internal institutional reform.
It is also of much importance the reform and extension of the decisional role of the European Parliament and of a stable Presidency of EU with an extended mandate after a previous internal reform and a simplification of the bureaucracy. In this context, an increase of the reflexive public transparency concerning the decision process of the EU institutions and the accession criteria for the new Candidate States, thanks to a monitorisation by the EU Council of the Sage, would deserve to become a priority.
4. The urgency of rapid integration of all States which have signed Membership Agreements with EU
Considering generally the slow rhythm of adaptation of the ex-communist to the economic, legislative and administrative conditions and standards of EU, in order not to deepen or create new rents of development between themselves or between them and the the communitary countries, conferring a Status of EU Political Member would serve both the necessity of monitorisation by the European Council, the imposition of a "discipline" the candidates have already consented to and the stimulation of their own internal reforms as concerns the associated countries. In the same time, establishing this type of affiliation to EU would represent a solemn commitment of support from the Presidency of EU on the basis of a permanent strict assessment of their democratic achievements towards a subsequent determination of the proper moment for economic and social integration.
5. The necessity to define and institutionalise rigorously the lobby procedures and the Consultative Status for the major non-governmental institutions by the European institutions with a decision role
Involving the Member-States and the European transnational interest groups in the process of institutional reforms of EU would give way to the current use with a convenient degree of transparency of some mechanisms of permanent consulting and information and of rigorous institutionalisation of the lobby procedures for them by the Commission -- or the future European Government -- the Parliament and the Presidency of EU. In this direction the means offered by the Economic or Social Council or the Committee of the Regions could contribute more to the process of fundamenting the decisions the European Government should adopt in the future, Government whose volume of work will be in continuous increase.
It could also be mentioned here the imposition and stimulation of the role of credible representatives for the civic societies in EU and the Candidate-States in the monitorisation and continual assessment of the results of the process of economic and social integration in the accession negotiations in co-operation with and warranted by the new reformed European Presidency and the European Parliament. Related to this point the future EU Treaty could establish for the European NGOs active in different fields of the harmonisation process a consultative/association Status similar to that offered by the Council of Europe or UNESCO to representative NGOs.
6. Promoting a realistic and unitary security concept for the new Europe
This desideratum for which there is, at least in principle, a large consensus, would assume renouncing the spurious dilemma which makes the problem move between consenting to the dependence on the USA protection shield and ensuring a European identity emancipated as regards security and defence policies. The current degree of globalisation of the potential threats and conflicts makes manifest, in fact, a better co-ordination of the policies in this field between the partners on the two shores of the Atlantic by mechanisms of mutual assistance established by permanent consulting and co-operation between the military heads of EU (a Euro-Corp really developed and capable to become autonomous) and the NATO Integrated Command Board, especially in critical situations of military conflict or danger for the common security. In this context, the Council of Europe would constitute the filter and deontologic guide for the active policies of preventing and administrating the conflicts and crises which could constitute a threat for the ideals and objectives of the whole Europe. It is clear for everyone that Europe should not depend exclusively on USA. Only for putting into practice a co-operation on the same par with it would be necessary to formulate an external and security policy, at least concerning major problems, and the expression of a unitary firm political will, especially in the context of conflicts and crises with an international impact. Only by promoting such a unique European policy and adopting the attitude of EU regarding the appearance of new migratory waves towards Europe it is possible to avoid the "besieged fortress" syndrome.
7. Refounding the European educational system in view of forging an enriched common identity
In a Europe which assumes the principles of an organisation of federalist type it would be compulsory to rethink and refound the whole educational system on the co-ordinates of cultivating the universal values, pluralism/coexistence of several conceptions on good and evil (cf. Hanna Arendt), interculturality and laicity. This would be the premise necessary to configure a new veritable common European identity to fight growing xenophobia, racism, intolerance or "Euro-scepticism", respecting not only formalistically the diversity of ethno-cultural sensitivities and characteristics non-violently experienced.
B. The (minimalist) realist-moderate scenario
A Europe taking on a prudent organisational transformation with a well-timed tendency for the rhythm of internal reforms, previous to the accession of the new Members, and marked by periodical syncopations, a Europe evolving to a political and constitutional architecture at least confederal, assuming a philosophy of extending to the East in degrees and the persistence of "more speeds" -- the so-called variable geometry -- concerning the embrace of the Monetary Union or other controversial chapters.
Such a perspective which is less favourable for the acceleration of the rhythm of receiving new Member-States and does not assume a complete surpass of the actual state of decisional institutional crisis within the Union after Maastricht – paralysis according to certain authors -- could be characterised by the following traits which are to be briefly described, analysed and assessed:
Such a polarisation between the interests and priorities still considered of "strategic national interest" and those of the so-called engine or hardcore of the communitary construction (France-Germany) equivalates to maintaining an internal organisational indecision of the "big country / small country" type or between national characteristics and the risk of uniformisation represented by the excessive weight of the great states and interest groups behind them. In the case in which the deliberation procedures do not change before the accession of new Members, the present configuration could prove inhibiting and non-operational, especially in regional crisis situations, for being able to surpass the deadlocks which a still very visible intergovernmentalism could maintain.
At this level also, the hesitations to accompany the European currency with a coherent political will strongly averred by unitary economic, commercial and social policies could prove damaging on a medium-term. However, even if the present co-ordinates and economic achievements are preserved – including the possible co-optation of the sterling – significant trepidations are not to be expected, but only a slower and more hesitant rhythm regarding the imposition and the credibility of the Euro.
The transfer of competences and prerogatives from the national parliaments and governments towards Brussels will continue to manifest even at the price of more slowness and indecision for the external picture of the Union. Certain governments more conservatory like the British or the Danish ones are sincerely afraid about the risk of a decisional hyper-centralisation in Brussels -- following the model of the French bureaucracy -- which is rejected by tradition in both capitals where the principle of subsidiarity has already been in use in almost all the public policies promoted. However the role of the (Euro)regions and of the regional integration will continue to grow in spite of a still fragile political-economic lobby of the regions by the European Commission and the Council of Ministers.
All the reticences concerning a common external and security policy will give way to a slack between the potential of the Single European Market, on the one hand, and the power of influence and credibility on an international level, on the other hand. Without accepting an extended mandate for the EU Presidency, rethought from the organisational and its power of decision point of view, all would be limited to external policy consulting and a continuation of the transfer of responsibility towards USA by NATO in major crisis situation. Only a significant change of the American policy by a retreat and non-interventionism in Europe could eventually mobilise the political energies towards a unity and coherence of views concerning external and security policy.
Despite the manifestation of an agglomerated background generated by the increasing pressures of the process of economic and financial globalisation, without adopting a common strategy of work extremely aggressive for fighting against unemployment and without increasing the flexibility of the labour market, the social bill to be paid will become more and more exorbitant. The social equilibrium, the equality of the chances and the demographic dynamics rather than the direct prosperity of the citizens will be affected. If Europe does not succeed to generate its own social and educational model, alternative to that of the informational and technological race in USA, it is likely that EU will be constrained to conform to the American trend, except for the flexibility peculiar to the American labour market.
The ambitions, interests and prides regarding particularly this problem are incredibly great. On the one hand, there is a certain fear justified by the possibility of partisan politisation of the European Parliament, on the other hand, there is the reticence for maintaining an exaggerated decisional weight for the body of multinational technical experts of the European Commission. These polarisations point to the idea that it is not possible an elimination of the present "democratic deficit" on a European level, but only a decrease of it in the case in which the political will of France and Germany will succeed to become highly relevant.
Based on pragmatic reasons, EU is considered to opt in the future for an extension in three or four steps following the model of coupling the vans according to their class. Even if this approach bears the risk of endangering the stability of the economic and social stability in certain countries in the waiting room, it minimises the risks assumed by the Fifteen. It's obvious this perspective does not take into account the frustrations, the internal tensions and the direct or indirect pressures the Candidate-States are forced to bear during the accession negotiations. The future relation of the EU with the pretenders at accession will be based in this case on formal negotiations between the two parts, which means that an involvement of the Candidate countries in solving the institutional crisis and establishing their own costs for accession will not be favoured.
A Europe more and more folding to itself and fragile from the point of view of security and even prosperity, incapable to leave aside the nationalist or regionalist prides, ready to delay accepting the ex-communist countries, but subject to endless waves of emigrants and to the hegemonic pressures of ascending world powers.
Mentioning the elements of such a course of events takes mainly into account a few major risk elements which could affect the European construction: an increase in the retractile tendency of USA regarding the assumption of the mission to ensure security for the Western partners in the case of regional crises; a decrease regarding the capacity of adaptation of the European labour market liable to turn EU into a province; accelerated ageing of the native population in EU countries against the background of a high demographic rate of immigrants from Asiatic and African countries, of non-Christian ethnic groups; the delay sine die of the process of European unification on the background of the connected crises in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, accompanied by increasing frustration among the people in the States Candidate to accession.
A rough description of the potential tendencies of development in the case such a scenario would become the real one includes:
However, such a scenario is less likely to become real in peace circumstances than in a crisis situation. That certain groups of European citizens have lost their enthusiasm for the continuation of the process of European unification is not equivalent to a support for freezing the extension of EU or blocking the European integration. However, a potential failure for the stability of the Euro as well as the appearance of new polarisations of the interests regarding external or economic policy of the Member States of EU could lead to a gradual dissolution of the motivation which fed in the past the dynamics of the European architecture. Paradoxically at a first glance, a Euro-sceptical evolution would be rather an advantage for Europe's adversaries and a temporisation of the steps of EU extension to the East. Putting thus in stand-by the whole process of bringing near the West and the East seems to be a disadvantage to the highest degree for Romania's needs of development on a medium-term. Due to the discrepancies accumulated during the process of preparing for the accession, Romania could take any uncertain delay or loss of the fundamental substance of the European construction as a sign of demobilisation.
The Romanian Stance towards the European Construction. Adaptation and Perspectives
Although Romania does not participate directly or officially in the process of reflection on EU institutional reform, it has formulated various critical observations in a more or less discrete manner on the functionality of the relations with European partners as well as on the formal consulting of the candidate countries concerning the future co-ordinates of the common construction.
In fact, Romania seems to be too disadvantaged by the incapacity to put into practice satisfactorily its own internal commitments and desiderata for being able to claim more than a temporary role in the present stage of the process of rethinking the extended European development. In almost all fundamental analyses certain dominant ideas recur which attest the fragility – for using an euphemism -- of the results of the reform process for the Romanian society:
Unfortunately, as it may be noticed, these forms of crisis, exceed by far the technical contabilisation the European Commission does periodically concerning Romania.
The mentioned Commission limits itself to notice the effects of the consequences the accumulation of the anomalies noticed above. The confrontation between the registers no matter how large of the acquis communautaire and the legislative changes, including those adopted after years of pressures and efforts, cannot constitute a tool sufficiently effective for stimulating the rhythm of internal sector transformation and even less a catalyser for the process much more complex of refounding the society as a whole.
Compared to the mentioned models, it is obvious a responsible Government, interested in an improvement and an acceleration of the decisions referring to European unification by the extension of EU should favour a radical scenario of evolution for the European construction. Especially Romania would deserve to take an active part in towards obtaining an affiliation of political type to EU. This would bring the whole society in a mobilisation for profound changes which would lead to greater responsibilities, reform activities more strictly assessed by the Romanian government. In the same time, Romania’s voice could be better heard during the debates over the common European future and the results of the preparation process for full adherence would became visible sooner, especially in their positive dimension for the citizens. A large part of the present political demagogy concerning the risks of losing the national sovereignty, ethnical segregation, territorial secession, colonial marginalisation of Romanian by an international plot would lose in this way from its virulence and legitimacy.
A pro-European and reformist rule-of-law governing would thus exploit the lane offered by a sooner settlement of the of the present communitary crisis, in the sense of assuming the federalist trend of Europe by:
No matter which will be the forces and the manner of governing of those who will access to power after the elections in November 2000, it is very unprobable that on a short term a significant resettlement concerning both the exigencies/expectations of EU and the capacity to rethink the prioritary needs of the Romanian society in view of its full accession and a justified participation at the reflection on the relaunch of the European construction and unification might take place. In the case, with a high degree of probability, of a conjunctural coalition made up of the ex-communists, reformed or "moderate", grouped in an opportunistic manner and by clientele in three social-democratic parties and the ante-war liberal party, recently divided, it is very likely that a minimum resistance line will be adopted as regards the energies in favour of profound changes. In this case, the temporisation of the radical reforms or the promotion of another profile for the leaders with power of decision concerning the European integration could be considered difficult, due to the regime constraining any political cohabitation. In this situation Romania's capacity to push the EU agenda to the acute needs of development in Romania could not be but relatively modest. The role played by the President will remain important, both for elegantly hindering the reforms and for stimulating them in his position of national mediator. Thus, due to the powerful persistence of the paternalist and semi-patriarchal type of society, only imposing in radical terms and rather top-down a conduct and a contabilisation of the activities in the sphere of public politicies could get Romania out of the zone of half-darkness, inertia and decisional ambiguity it is placed currently. Thus, on a background of accumulation of ever more acute social and material frustration, the public opinion could gradually lose its interest in the exigencies, advantages and the costs on a medium-term of integration, offering a free hand to the nostalgic persons and Euro-sceptics of all kinds.
The luxury of dwelling on variants of minimal compromise and simulated obedience to the conditions expressed by EU becomes harder and harder to justify and maintain economically by Romania. However, only to the extent to which the European Commission decides to give course to guidance, conditioning and rigorous monitorisation of the effective progresses/results in each field of the preparation for integration, we could speak about a chance of credible improvement of the situation of our country and its placing on the orbit of a plausible and feasible European integration.
For transposing such an objective, officially promoted both by the Romanian authorities and by the Presidency of EU, it is vital to assume a loyal partnership relation which shouldn’t exclude at all a severe tutorship from the Union, a free-consented role of disciple from Romania as well as an auto-generated disponibility permanently motivated by the appearance of a space of common fundamental values towards the achievement of an irreversible European unification and consolidation .
However, the recent Report of the European Commission seems to shatter any illusions about convincing the EU officials to couple quasi-automatically the Romanian van to the communitary locomotive on the basis of political criteria. The satisfaction, always partial and fragmentary, of the reform commitments it has assumed cannot be dissembled anymore, all the more so as both the governants and the opposition have repeatedly and conceitedly opposed to a direct monitorisation by the Commission -- which is, for instance, the case of Bulgaria. Considering the obvious incapacity of credible and responsible administration Romania confronts to such a large extent, it is pretty obvious that a simple conditioning from the distance regarding the support of EU would not function as an engine powerful enough for respecting the promises and assessing in a realist manner the results obtained.
So long EU has avoided to involve itself in a manner liable to offend somehow the sovereignty aspirations of the Candidate-States. Nevertheless this led to long delays and much suffering, at least in the case of the former Yugoslavia republics. It is desirable that in the special case of Romania the Europeans should not wait again for a new major crisis before intervening decisively. The complexity of the situation requires from EU public acknowledgement of the immaturity of the democratisation process in Romania and more substantial involvement, even without expecting the governants, whichever they would be, to expressly ask for that.
The next few months will prove very soon the direction we have chosen, a direction, we hope, of profound changes of mentality and action towards recoupling Romania to the European ship which so many of its citizens deserve and dream of .
The Option of the European Leaders for a Minimalist Scenario. Post-Nice Reflections
Although the differences of opinion and the difficulty of reaching an agreement on the occasion of the European Council in Nice were predictable, there had not been many to believe that the main promoters of the text to be approved would come to label it as only "convenient". Almost all subsequent comments and analyses made very clear that the responsibility for the failure of not adopting certain crucial decisions with regard to fiscal and social convergence and integration belonged to the British Government. We shall not commit us here to an analysis of the reasons motivating the sceptic position of the Cabinet Blair.
Yet, on the other hand, it is obvious we could not make it the only responsible for the relative failure of the meeting on Cote d’Azure. Moreover, the controversies and even the rents could be perceived on several levels and types of relations inter-state/between groups of states. More exactly, one could see freely that the Fifteen could not surpass, in general, the logic of a very prudent co-operation of inter-governmental type. In this sense, the characterisation given by the President of the European Parliament, Mrs. Nicole Fontaine, was specifically one of "re-nationalisation of the spirits" (see the interview in "La Tribune" daily from December, 12, 2000) on the occasion of the Council in Nice. The only hope for a more radical reform for the next period remains, in fact, the engagement to rediscuss the agenda of the institutional reform in 2004. Obviously, the unwillingness of surpassing the national interest and egoism prevents us for the moment of speaking of a European Union de facto.
However, a few relatively modest results worthy to be considered have been achieved.
First, the extension of the vote system with a qualified majority but, unfortunately, only with regard to 30 topics. Thus, most of the Member States succeeded to exempt their favourite fields or the ones considered as a prerogative of national sovereignty. Spain, for instance, has succeeded to preserve a right of veto over the use of structural funds until 2013! That would ensure any Spanish Government against disadvantages relative to the new comers, especially Poland.
Second, in view of the extension, it has been realised a "rebalancing" of the number of votes due to each country, leaving however still open the possibility that three admittedly large states in a alliance with a so-called small state could block a decision within the Council of Ministers. Only 9 states, large and small, will be able to block together such a decision. The degree of complexity of the decisional system grew higher through the establishment of three "decisional thresholds": state majority, qualified majority, demographic barrier (obviously a justificative principle of a purely statistical type!) – namely, by request, a state could ask that a certain inconvenient or controversial decision should obtain indirectly the approval of at least 62% from the EU population. It is very clear that is intended to inhibit any decision too bold, being well known how difficult it is to obtain easily so large a multinational support for a more radical or innovative project.
Third, it has been reached a higher degree of suppleness of the so-called system of "consolidated co-operation". It has been eliminated the right of veto of a Member State capable to block the appearance of such a "difference of speed" between the partners. No more than eight states are needed now in order to proceed a vanguard co-operation (as related to the hesitant states or to the ones unable to adapt to the rhythm imposed by the majority of the platoon) compared to the qualified majority which was requisite according to the old deliberation system. However, the Great Britain obtained, for instance, a total exemption from this decisional system of the problems of defence and of the arms industry among EU. The new formula increases, obviously, the risk of the emergence of different disagreements, frustrations and rivalries which could dilute, in the case of major divergences, the meaning itself of the idea to build a unitary extended European Union.
Fourth, it has been reached an agreement over a "prevention system" for new potential extremist excesses like the co-optation of the ultranationalists in the Austrian government. From now on, nine tenths of the total of the Council of Ministers will be able to decide the formulation of "special recommendations" to a state likely to trespass dangerously the democratic principles. A state could even lose its right to vote if it does not respect the aforementioned principles. In view of receiving new members, this represents a warning clear enough for any government trying to practice a double language and to impose the approval of its own democracy recipes in front of the other partners in the Union.
Fifth, it has been established a rather high ceiling of the European Parliament comprising 734 members but the obsolete unicameral structure or the limited prerogatives it detains have not been subject to any change. The chances of the ones believing in a European Parliament able to take its flight on its own are at least hindered by the preservation of the present style proper to the work sessions. The substantial differences in the perception of the role of the European MPs in their own countries should also be mentioned here and we shall not pause any longer over the difficulty to effectively adopt decisions with such an impressive number of deciders at least partially conditioned, as much as before, by the priorities of their own governments and parliaments.
Sixth, under the pressure of great European or pan-European nongovernmental organisations, including FIME that we represent in Romania, a Chart of the Fundamental Rights of the European citizens has been finally adopted in Nice. This Chart should be seen as an "embryo of the European Constitution" which would "open the way to debate and to the progress of the Union" (see the commentary suggestively called "L’Europe entravee" in "Les Echos" daily from December, 12, 2000). Many representatives of trade-union movements consider it as still very limited as regards the social stipulations it contains, especially from the point of view of guaranteeing a sufficient number of jobs or from the point of view of the strike right, easier to put in application. Nevertheless, in spite of any possible objections, an inclusion of the Chart in the text of the future European Treaty would be a great step and one of increasing significance if the candidate countries were also asked to include it in their own legislation and constitution before the agreement on their accession. For the moment, however, we do not have a final version of the Chart allowing us to assess effectively the legislative and procedural impact due to its enforcement.
Seventh, from the standpoint of the candidate countries, perhaps the most significant fact is the green wave given to the process of new accessions to EU beginning on 2003. It should also be mentioned here the announcement of the future number of votes in the Council of Ministers for the future Members. Poland has not hidden its satisfaction of receiving of number of votes (27) close to that of the "large states", although it has only 38 million of citizens, many of which already live and work clandestinely or officially for most of the time in other EU countries, especially Germany and France. The double measure and maybe even the dominant of a special caution could be noticed especially by the fact that Romania, with an official number of almost 23 million of citizens, -- probably exaggerated and obsolete after the big wave of disguised or clandestine emigrations after 1989 -- has not received but a number of votes (14) identical to that of countries with a little more than a third of Romania's population. Of course, from the point of view of Romania's political leaders, a lobby for the negotiation of a larger number of votes has not been at all a pre-electoral priority. The lack of interest for the role played in the future betrayed once again rather a gross dilettantism and the mean aims of the whole political class, incapable to realise, not even after 11 years, the unavoidable interaction between what happens in Bucharest and the decisions taken in Brussels.
The general tone of the analyses over the results of the Council in Nice, at least as related to the expectations and the blank hopes concerning this meeting, is rather a pessimistic one when it is not apocalyptic. If a notable European MP of conservative trend like Alain Lamassour has come to declare in a recent interview that "we have just witnessed the end of a certain manner of building Europe", it becomes requisite to realise the degree of deception produced by the impossibility to surpass the logic and the pressures of the inter-governmentalism able to block any chance of federalist emancipation/solving of the present deadlock. It is not the cultural differences, so much invoked, that inhibits the flexibility of the perspective over the new Europe, but the narrow computations of some obtuse bureaucracies parasiting damagingly the spring of any political aspiration, genuinely European. The indecision to establish as a ground a European Constitution is just a sign for the unwillingness to see farther and, especially, to go further. It is obvious that the formulation of such a Constitution wouldn't be a panacea but it would bring at least a more advantageous angle for the rhythm and the direction of the reforms worthy to be promoted.
What is profoundly disturbing, from the point of view of a balanced safeguard of the public interest in Romania, relates to the fact that the EU Member States, through so many sources of divergence, have reached rather easily a consensus over the establishment of the Club rules for a long period, without at least one preliminary consultation with the future Members. Thus it has come to a model of Union with rules already made and unilaterally advantageous to the "old" Members, just like within the logic of the personnel of the old Communist Parties, so much mocked at. With rules already made, there are many chances that the new comers will behave only formally, lest they should not disturb anyone, or mime unconvincingly scores written before they were born towards which the affinities will issue at most from politeness.
It is difficult and almost useless to attribute responsabilities for the impossibility to deblock the present crisis situation. There are old problems that require a radical refreshment of the ways to recruit, select, educate and promote the political and administrative elites. Maybe only the time will impose a different tempo and genuinely courageous solutions in order to give Europe the chance of emancipation and political coherence that it fully deserves. As regards Romania, it is not imaginable that it could face alone these crises or elude its own European condition without affecting seriously its stability and democratisation. It is not only the fact that Romania needs tangentially Europe but, at least, its need of acceptance is much more vital than that of the present Europe, too anaesthetised by the consumerist mirage for being able to feel brutally any shock. A stage remains to be passed through; within this stage, in spite of all drawbacks and imperfections, the fate of transforming Romania depends directly proportionally to its capacity to adopt and assimilate all those changes that could make it European, without mechanical and useless repetitions of the mistakes in the past.
Extract from "Un concept romanesc privind viitorul Uniunii Europene", edited by the Open Society Foundation in Romania, , Polirom - Iasi, Romania, 2001.